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Abstract
We establish four necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the
Averch−Johnson effect in a generalized version of their famous model of the rate−of−return
regulated firm. The four necessary and sufficient conditions are then compared to the two
stronger sufficient conditions for the Averch−Johnson effect found in the literature. Our
analysis also permits us to put to rest a somewhat protracted debate about the very existence
of the Averch−Johnson effect.
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1. Introduction
Since the publication of the seminal paper of Averch and Johnson (1962) modeling the behavior
of a firm operating under rate-of-return regulation, numerous researchers have sought to refine
and extend the properties of the model, among them Takayama (1969, 1993), Baumol and
Klevorick (1970), Zajac (1970, 1972), and El-Hodiri and Takayama (1973).  At one juncture,
even a somewhat protracted debate took place between Takayama (1969) and El-Hodiri and
Takayama (1973) on the one hand, and Pressman and Carol (1971, 1973) on the other, concern-
ing the very existence of the so-called Averch-Johnson effect (hereafter A-J effect), defined as a
negative sign for the partial derivative of the optimal value of the regulated input with respect to
the rate-of-return parameter.  This note puts an end to that debate once and for all.  We accom-
plish this by proving, subject to three basic assumptions on the model, that (i) the optimal value
of the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the rate-of-return constraint does not necessarily lie
in the positive unit interval, (ii) the A-J effect cannot be unequivocally derived from the assertion
of maximizing behavior alone, and (iii) the A-J effect is equivalent to four economically intuitive
conditions emanating from the model.  Moreover, we derive these results using a more general
model than has typically been contemplated in the literature.  Finally, we relate the four neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the A-J effect to the two stronger sufficient
conditions that are prevalent in the literature.
2. The Value of the Lagrange Multiplier
The Averch and Johnson (1962) model of the rate-of-return regulated firm is so well known that
we can be relatively succinct in presenting our slight generalization of it.  Consider, therefore, a
profit maximizing monopolist producing one homogeneous good, say  y Œ¬+, employing M
factors of production, say  x Œ¬+
M, which are purchased in competitive factor markets at prices
w Œ¬++
M .  The production function  f
M (): ◊ ¬Æ ¬ ++  is assumed to be a C
() 2  function on ¬++
M .
The monopolist faces the inverse demand function  P(): ◊ ¬Æ ¬ ++ , which is also assumed to be a
C
() 2  function on ¬++.  The revenue function  R
M (): ◊ ¬Æ ¬ ++  of the monopolist is defined by
RP f f () (() )() xx x =
def , which given our prior assumptions concerning differentiability, is similarly
a C
() 2  function on ¬++
M .  The regulatory constraint is the archetype one in that the rate-of-return
on capital is not allowed to exceed some “fair” value determined by the regulatory agency.  De-
fining  xM as the capital of the firm, or equivalently, the regulated input, we may write the gener-
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where s Œ¬++ is the fair rate-of-return on capital.  Hereafter, we refer to the constrained optimi-
zation problem (1) as the generalized A-J model.
We impose and maintain the following three standard assumptions on problem (1)
throughout the note:
(A.1) sw M > .
(A.2) For each aw = ŒÃ ¬ ++
+ def (, ) s
M A
1 there exists an interior C
() 1  solution to problem (1),
which we denote by xx a =
*() , with ll =
*() a  being the optimal value of the Lagrange
multiplier corresponding to the rate-of-return constraint.2
(A.3) The rate-of-return constraint is binding, and not just binding, at xx a =
*() .
Assumption (A.1) is basic in the literature and fundamental to problem (1).  It amounts to as-
serting that the fair rate-of-return on capital is larger than the rental price of one unit of capital,
thereby permitting the monopolist to earn a positive profit.  It is important to recognize that since
the rate-of-return constraint is assumed to be binding (and not just binding) in assumption (A.3),
the solution to problem (1) does not coincide with the unconstrained solution of problem (1),
which would be found by ignoring the rate-of-return constraint.  It is also worthwhile to note that
in contrast to the existing literature, we have not made any assumptions about the slope of the in-
verse demand function, the slope of the revenue function with respect to the factors of production
or output, the marginal products of the inputs, or the curvature of the production function, nor are
we limiting ourselves to two factors of production.
The Lagrangian function for problem (1) is defined as




















To verify the classical rank condition on the constraint function that is prerequisite for the La-
grangian approach, we define
gw x s x R jj
j
M








The gradient of g() ◊  with respect to x is given by
  



































As long as — π
*
x xaa 0 g M (( ); ),   where  0M  is the null vector in  ¬
M, then Theorem 2.3 of
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Recall that with Eqs. (4)–(6) as necessary conditions, we have xx a =
*()   and ll =
*() a  as their
simultaneous solutions for each a ŒA.
The first thing to note about the solution to problem (1) is that l
* > () a 0.  To see this, as-
sume to the contrary that l
* = () a 0.  Then the first-order necessary conditions (4) and (5) would
be identical to the first-order necessary conditions for the unconstrained version of problem (1),
thereby implying that the solutions to the constrained and unconstrained versions of problem (1)
are identical.  But this contradicts the implication of assumption (A.3) that the rate-of-return con-
straint is binding (and not just binding), namely, that the solutions to the constrained and uncon-
strained versions of problem (1) differ.  Therefore, l
* > () a 0.  We can similarly show that
l
* π () a 1.  To this end, assume to the contrary that l
* = () a 1, so that Eq. (5) reduces to sw M = .
But this contradicts assumption (A.1), scilicet that sw M > , thereby implying that l
* π () a 1.
Furthermore, note that because sw M >  by assumption (A.1), it follows from Eq. (5) that if3
∂∂ Rx s M (( ) ) xa
* > , then l
* > () a 1, whereas if  ∂∂ Rx w MM (( ) ) xa
* < , then l
* Œ () (,) a 01.   Note
also that the case wR x s MM <<
* ∂∂ (( ) ) xa  is ruled out by the condition l
* > () a 0.  In sum, we
have shown that imposing only assumptions (A.1)–(A.3) on problem (1), we can only conclude
that 0 1 < π
* l () a .  We state this important conclusion in the ensuing lemma.
Lemma 1.  Under assumptions (A.1)–(A.3), the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier corre-
sponding to the rate-of-return constraint in the generalized A-J model defined by Eq. (1) et. seq.
obeys 01 < π
* l () a .
Since l
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exactly the same as the first M -1 first-order necessary conditions in the unconstrained version






















Because xx a =
*()   is not a solution to the unconstrained version of problem (1) and must satisfy
the  M -1 first-order necessary conditions (7), it follows that ∂∂ Rx w MM (( ) ) xa
* - π 0.  To see
this, simply note that if ∂∂ Rx w MM (( ) ) xa
* -= 0, then the solutions to the constrained and un-
constrained versions of problem (1) would be identical, thereby violating assumption (A.3).
Since l
* π () a 0 from Lemma 1, it follows from Eq. (8) that ∂∂ Rx w MM (( ) ) xa
* - π 0 if and only
if ∂∂ Rx s M (( ) ) xa
* - π 0.  Thus our assumption above that — π
*
x xaa 0 g M (( ); )  is in fact valid,
since the first M -1 components of —
*
x xaa g(( ); ) are equal to zero by Eq. (7), while its Mth
component is nonzero as we have just demonstrated.  This justifies our use of the Lagrangian ap-
proach in characterizing the generalized A-J model defined in Eq. (1).
3. The A-J Effect
With the exception of McNicol (1973), the principal focus of the existing literature, at least as far
as comparative statics are concerned, has been on determining the sign of ∂∂ xs M
* () a .
Takayama (1969, pp. 259–260) was the first to rigorously demonstrate that ∂∂ xs M
* < () a 0 for
the two factor case, albeit under stronger assumptions than used here, a point we shall return to
in section 4.  The economic interpretation of this comparative statics result is that a decrease in
the allowable rate-of-return on capital induces the firm to raise its capital stock, a conclusion
which is now referred to as the A-J effect.
The principal reason why additional ad hoc assumptions beyond the maximization asser-
tion and assumptions (A.1)–(A.3) are required in order to sign ∂∂ xs M
* () a  is due to the assertion
by Silberberg (1990, p. 202) that “ ... , no refutable hypotheses are implied by the maximization
hypothesis alone, for parameters entering the constraint.”  In other words, Silberberg (1990) has
shown that when parameters enter the constraints of an optimization problem one will not, in
general, be able to sign individual partial derivatives of the decision variables with respect to
such parameters under the maximization assertion alone, such as the A-J effect derivative
∂∂ xs M
* () a .  The implication of Silberberg’s (1990, p. 202) analysis, therefore, is that additional
assumptions beyond (A.1)–(A.3) must be imposed on problem (1) that are not implied by the
maximization assertion in order to unequivocally demonstrate that ∂∂ xs M
* < () a 0, i.e., in order4
to establish the A-J effect.  To see that the A-J effect may fail to hold under assumptions (A.1)–
(A.3), i.e., that ∂∂ xs M





def a , where a > s.  One can then
show that  xw 11
* = () a  and xw s 2
1
2 1
21 *- =- () [ ] a a  are the unique, globally optimal interior solutions
to the generalized A-J problem (1), where laa
*- =- - > () [ ] [ ] a ws 2
1 1.  It is then straightfor-




*- =- > () [ ] a a .  In passing,
we remark that even though this observation of Silberberg’s (1990) is true in general, it does not
rule out interesting and important comparative statics results in optimization problems which
have parameters in the constraints, as is manifest in the prototype utility maximization problem.
4. Four Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the A-J Effect
Since one cannot unambiguously establish that ∂∂ xs M
* < () a 0 based solely on the maximization
assertion and assumptions (A.1)–(A.3), additional assumptions must be imposed on problem (1)
in order to do so.  The auxiliary assumptions contemplated in the literature include (i) the opti-
mal value of the Lagrange multiplier lies between zero and unity [Takayama (1969, p. 257)], (ii)
the revenue function is concave in capital and labor [Baumol and Klevorick (1970, p. 167) and
El-Hodiri and Takayama (1973, p. 236)], (iii) the marginal products of capital and labor are
positive, the isoquants are strictly convex to the origin, and the marginal product of labor in-
creases with increases in capital along an isoquant [McNicol (1973, pp. 430–431)], (iv) the slope
of the revenue function with respect to output is positive [Takayama (1993, p. 215)], and (v) the
feasible set of the complementary problem (13) defined below is closed and bounded, i.e., it is
compact [Zajac (1972, p. 129)].  None of these assumptions is implied by the constrained maxi-
mization hypothesis, but each is either sufficient or necessary and sufficient for proving that
∂∂ xs M
* < () a 0, as we now proceed to demonstrate.
To begin, substitute xx a =
*()   into Eq. (6), use the fact that l
* > () a 0 by Lemma 1, dif-
ferentiate the resulting identity with respect to s, and then simplify the result using the first-order
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This conclusion asserts that the capital stock of the firm increases with a decrease in the fair rate-
of-return, if and only if, the marginal revenue product of the capital stock evaluated at the opti-
mal solution is less than the fair rate-of-return.
Next observe that the relation (( ) ) ( ) [ ( ( ) ) ] 1-= - - -
** l ax a sw R x s MM ∂∂  follows from
Eq. (8).  Furthermore, since sw M >  by assumption (A.1) and l
* > () a 0 by Lemma 1, the previ-

















An inspection of Eqs. (9) and (10) shows that l ∂∂
** Œ¤ < () (,) () aa 01 0 xs M , i.e., the optimal
value of the Lagrange multiplier lying inside the positive unit interval is equivalent to the exis-
tence of the A-J effect.5
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of problem (1) to arrive at another intuitive condition equivalent to l
* Œ () (,) a 01.  Using Eq. (3),
which defines the constraint function g() ◊ , and the first-order necessary conditions in Eq. (7), we
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0,
which in turn implies that hM = 0.  Noting that    ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
22 1 Lxx Rxx kk ll =- () [ ] l  from the
definition of the Lagrangian function in Eq. (2), and using hM = 0, we can reduce the above sec-
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That is, an optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier that lies inside the positive unit interval is
equivalent to the local concavity of the revenue function in the first M -1 inputs (excluding the
capital stock).
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This conclusion asserts that the A-J effect is equivalent to the local concavity of the revenue
function in the first M -1 inputs (excluding the capital stock).  Thus Eqs. (9), (10), (11), and
(12) establish an equivalence between the A-J effect, the range of the optimal value of the La-
grange multiplier, the marginal revenue product of the capital stock evaluated at the optimal so-
lution relative to the fair rate-of-return, and the local concavity of the revenue function in all the
inputs but the capital stock.  This is the central result of our note.  We therefore summarize it in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.  Under assumptions (A.1)–(A.3), the ensuing four conditions are equivalent in the
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Lemma 2 shows that the assumed global concavity of the revenue function in all the in-
puts by Baumol and Klevorick (1970, p. 167) and El-Hodiri and Takayama (1973, p. 236), al-
though sufficient, is certainly not necessary for the A-J effect.  Just as important is the fact that
Lemma 2 lays to rest the rather protracted controversy concerning the existence of the A-J effect
between Takayama (1969) and El-Hodiri and Takayama (1973) on the one hand, and Pressman
and Carol (1971, 1973) on the other, and does so with a more general model.
The next matter to elucidate pertains to the following statement by Takayama (1993, p.
215): “The statement of 0 1 <<
* l () a  shown above has been debated in the literature.  Averch
and Johnson’s (1962, p. 1056) proof amounts to assuming it.  El-Hodiri and Takayama (1973)
showed that this assumption can be dispensed with if (the revenue) function G [R() ◊  in our no-
tation] is concave.  What we have shown above is that such a concavity assumption can be dis-
pensed with.”  This is a misleading statement, as we now proceed to show.  Takayama (1993, p.
215) had to assume that the slope of the revenue function with respect to output is positive at the
optimum, i.e., marginal revenue is positive at the optimal solution, in order to prove that
l
* Œ () (,) a 01.  However, this assumption is equivalent to l
* Œ () (,) a 01, as can be seen by using
Takayama’s (1993, p. 215) result that ( ( )) ( ( )) 10 ->
** l aa MR y , where MR y (( ) )
* a  is the value of
marginal revenue at the optimal output level  y
*() a .  Since l
* > () a 0 by Lemma 1, the strict ine-
quality ( ( )) ( ( )) 10 ->
** l aa MR y   implies that l
** Œ¤ > () (,) ( () ) aa 01 0 MR y .  Therefore, as-
suming that MR y (( ) )
* > a 0, as Takayama (1993, p. 215) does, is fully equivalent to assuming
that  l
* Œ () (,) a 01, hence by our Lemma 2 also equivalent to assuming that the revenue function
is locally concave in all the inputs but the capital stock, or that the marginal revenue product of
the capital stock evaluated at the optimal solution is less than the fair rate-of-return, or that the
A-J effect holds.  Thus the assumption that MR y (( ) )
* > a 0 is the fourth necessary and sufficient
condition for the A-J effect.  In sum, we have shown that while it is true that in order to derive
the A-J effect “the concavity assumption can be dispensed with,” the price paid in order to do so
is an assumption that is implied by the one discarded and fully equivalent to the A-J effect itself.
Note, in passing, that Takayama (1993) could have equivalently used his assumption that the
marginal product of labor is positive at the optimal solution to reach his misleading conclusion in
the above quote.
We close this section by relating the work of Zajac (1972) to the results presented here.
In order to do so, we begin by writing down what Zajac (1972, p. 127) defines as the complement
of problem (1), videlicet
max ( ) ()( )
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.( 13)
Zajac (1972 p. 129) shows that if one assumes that the feasible set of the complementary prob-
lem (13) is closed and bounded, i.e., that it is compact, then (i) the solution of problem (13) oc-
curs where the constraint binds, (ii) the solution of problem (1) is identical to the solution of the
complementary problem (13) and occurs where the constraint of problem (1) also binds, and (iii)7
l
* Œ () (,) a 01.  By Lemma 2, therefore, the assumption that the feasible set of the complementary
problem (13) is compact is a sufficient condition for the existence of the A-J effect.  It is impor-
tant to recognize, however, that in general, the feasible set of problem (13) is neither closed nor





def a  and a > s,
the feasible set of the complementary problem (13) is unbounded and hence not compact.  In
passing, observe that the assumption of compactness of the feasible set of the complementary
problem (13) is weaker than concavity of the revenue function, as noted by Zajac (1972, p. 130).
To put the Zajac (1972) analysis in perspective, recall that Lemma 1 shows that the opti-
mal value of the Lagrange multiplier satisfies 0 1 < π
* l () a  under assumptions (A.1)–(A.3), not
the stronger conclusion l
* Œ () (,) a 01, the latter being necessary and sufficient for the A-J effect
by Lemma 2.  Moreover, under the maximization assertion and assumptions (A.1)–(A.3), we
have shown that one cannot unambiguously establish that ∂∂ xs M
* < () a 0, thereby demonstrating
that the A-J effect does not necessarily follow from the assertion of optimizing behavior and as-
sumptions (A.1)–(A.3).
5. Conclusions
The Averch and Johnson (1962) model of the rate-of-return regulated profit maximizing firm has
been in existence for over three decades, and a good deal of effort has been expended in order to
fully understand its economic content and extend its reach.  We have added to this literature by
proving that subject to three basic assumptions on the model, that (i) the optimal value of the La-
grange multiplier corresponding to the rate-of-return constraint does not necessarily lie in the
positive unit interval, (ii) the A-J effect cannot be unequivocally derived from the assertion of
maximizing behavior alone, and (iii) the A-J effect is equivalent to each of the four economically
intuitive conditions emanating from the model.  Moreover, we derived these results using a more
general model than has typically been contemplated in the literature, and have related them to the
two stronger sufficient conditions that are prevalent in the literature.  Lemma 2 and the paragraph
that follows it, therefore, put to rest a protracted debate about the very existence of the A-J effect
since they establish four economically intuitive conditions equivalent to the A-J effect.
We close by remarking that even though we have established our results in a more gen-
eral model than has been heretofore considered, two further generalizations come to mind.  One
generalization would allow for multiple regulated inputs in the model, while another would relax
the assumption that inputs are perfectly divisible.  Such generalizations may be worthy of future
research.8
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